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Abstract 
The U.S. housing sector, including housing starts, house purchasing, and the institutions involved in 
financing house purchases, has been unstable for most of the past century. We divide the years since 
1920 into periods and study the instability for each period. We found that there was no Golden Age of 
stability in the sector. Instead, the time intervals that we studied were each characterized by metrics of 
instability that were equal within a reasonable margin of error. These results imply that the U.S. has 
built a stock of housing and has succeeded in making home ownership an attainable dream, but that 
accomplishment is overshadowed by the frequent booms and busts. In a second paper we intend to 
examine the effects on economic growth and recessions that have been associated with the instability in 
the housing sector. The social costs of instability have been large, and our estimate will be intended to 
provoke debate and further research.  
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1. Introduction 
For the past century home-building and home ownership have been strongly associated with periods of 
sustained economic growth in the US, but downturns in home-building have often been blamed for 
periods of slow or negative economic growth. For the past seven years, the slow, sputtering recovery of 
home-building and home ownership has been cited as one of the underlying reasons why the U.S. 
economic recovery that began in March 2009 has been so sluggish. It has also been argued that the 
housing market might have recovered more quickly after 2009 if foreclosure procedures had produced 
outcomes more quickly, but the mortgage market was also slow to recover. 
Data on housing starts, available from 1920 onward, indicates that the current severe downturn in 
housing construction and ownership is only the most recent chapter in a long history of volatility. Data 
from the 1920s to the present day indicate that the United States has struggled to create a system for 
financing home purchases. Demographic data indicate the demand for housing should have been 
predictable, but home-building and purchases were nevertheless unstable. A review of the financial 
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practices suggests some possible reasons for the instability. For the decades before World War II, 
financing for home buyers was frequently unavailable, and when it was available, it was on terms that 
often proved unfavorable to the home buyer. This spotty, bumpy performance is disturbing and has 
proved surprisingly difficult to remedy. For comparison, one can consider the financing institutions to 
the legal system for adjudicating disputes about property lines and ownership claims. That may be an 
unfair comparison, because it might be easier to adjudicate disputes about ownership of land than to 
finance the purchase of houses. Nevertheless, the legal system appears to have reached a satisfactory 
degree of stability much earlier. The practices of transferring title to property functioned smoothly for 
most of the past century. The legal system also could, during most of the years since 1920, handle 
foreclosures in routine fashion. The crisis of 2008-2009 revealed, however, that the systems did not 
work equally well in all the states. The sudden jump in the number of foreclosures overloaded the 
processing capability. 
There has been political will to improve the conventional ways of financing home purchases. Starting 
in the Thirties, Congress authorized the creation of the Federal Housing Administration and the United 
States Housing Authority. These entities sought to improve availability of housing and also worked 
with financial intermediaries to increase the pool of mortgage funds. After World War II there were 
more initiatives, and for the immediate post-war years, financing was more abundant and the terms 
were better suited to the buyers’ income and net worth. The interest-only mortgage loans gave way to 
the amortizing loans, so that after twenty or twenty-five years the buyer could own the house free of 
debt. In those ways there was progress toward making the residential financing sector more 
accommodating and accessible to middle-class buyers whose parents had not been able to own their 
own home. Conventional practices after World War II were easier for new buyers than the archaic 
methods in use by traditional financial intermediaries before World War II, but conventional financing 
practices did not continuously evolve and develop as smoothly and efficaciously as the legal system for 
recording and reporting ownership. 
In this paper we focus on the variability in the construction and purchases of houses in the United 
States from 1920 onward. We find that for the entire period home building has experienced booms and 
busts, and that there have been prolonged periods of depressed activity, interspersed with brief, giddy 
periods of boom, followed by overbuilding, bankruptcies and foreclosures. For expository purposes we 
divide that time frame into the decade of the Twenties, the decade of the Great Depression, and three 
post-World War II eras: from 1945 to 1971; from 1972 to 2008; and from 2009 to the present. To 
characterize each of the three post-World War II eras, we label them as the savings-bank era, the 
deregulation, consolidation and securitization era, and the post-crisis prudent era. We describe 
quantitatively each of the pre-World War II decades, and each of the three post-war eras and argue that 
the country’s overall record of achievement is less than fully satisfactory. Each time frame that we 
studied displayed a degree of volatility greater than our casual preconception prepared us for. We 
expected that housing finance had been relatively stable for some periods of time in the country’s past. 
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But the data did not support our rose-tinted preconception. On the most macro scale, Americans 
became homeowners, but the path was never smooth. The nation’s accomplishment was that millions of 
households were able to buy their own home and pay off the mortgage. Home ownership indeed did 
increase in the decade before the Great Depression, and again after World War II. A quantum leap in 
home ownership occurred in the three eras after World War II. For the Twenties and Thirties 
homeownership hovered around 45%; the quantum leap was in the years immediately following 1945. 
By 1950 home ownership had already leaped up to 55% of households. From there it rose to 66% in 
2000. 
That gain in home ownership was an accomplishment, but it came at a disturbingly, and probably 
unnecessarily high cost. The cost was volatility in home building and home buying, during a time 
period when trends in household formation were clear enough to allow for much steadier activity in 
construction and purchases. The less visible cost was incomplete coverage of all demographic groups. 
It was presumably a social objective that all households should have equal access to home ownership. 
Yet there were many demographic groups and geographical regions within the United States that did 
not have as much access to financing as the national norm. In the sequel to this paper, we compute 
estimates of the cost of both of these imperfections in the system’s performance. The cost of each 
imperfection is measured relative to potential GDP for each year. In the second paper we attempt to 
show that because of the volatility, economic growth was slower and more unstable than was 
theoretically possible. We propose to compute the lost economic growth as a percent of GDP each year. 
There were years when growth was raised by booms in home-building and purchases, but there were 
more years when home-building and home-buying were below their ideal level, and in those years, 
economic growth was lower that it would have been if the financing had been steadily available. For 
the incomplete coverage, we identify a relatively deprived demographic and compute what the increase 
in GDP would have been if that group had been more fully able to obtain financing to purchase houses. 
There were losses in addition to those two, for example the cyclical unemployment of workers in 
residential construction, and the human cost of evictions and foreclosures. Our analysis does not 
attempt to quantify those losses; the two losses that we compute are sufficiently large to indicate the 
cost of our underperforming financial services sector. 
The papers in this series are as follows. In the first paper we give a quantitative overview of the entire 
1920-2016 time period of housing finance in the United States, and quantitative details of the 
accomplishments and failures of each of the two pre-World War II decades, then each of the three de 
facto housing finance systems that operated in each of the three post-World War II eras. In the second 
paper we compute the lost economic growth that the de facto mechanisms have caused. Then in the 
third paper of this three-part series we propose new ways of financing home buying, attempting to 
reinvigorate successful elements of the three de facto mechanisms.  
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2. Housing Finance in the United States 1920-2016 
Housing finance has become intertwined with the aspirations of the broad middle of the American 
socio-economic strata. It is the means by which most home buyers succeed in purchasing homes. It has 
played a pivotal role in building nest eggs for millions of people. It has also fueled speculative bubbles 
and has derailed the lives of many former homeowners. 
The Twenties and the Thirties began with a steep climb, followed by an even steeper plunge. The 
finance sector was caught up in the rise and can be accused of financing the overbuilding in Florida that 
came down in 1926. The finance sector can also be accused of setting the stage for the Great 
Depression. But the finance sector was not in the role of steward of the nation’s financial stability. The 
sector consisted of private firms, each operating according to its own practices. Supervision came 
starting in 1933, and it was not until 1946 when the Congress formally made full employment and 
macroeconomic stability into expressed national goals. It is, therefore, inappropriate to criticize the 
sector for providing varying amounts or inadequate amounts of financing to home buyers. The sector 
was a decentralized aggregation of entities that did not have overarching social goals nor a formal 
hierarchy above the level of the boards of directors of the individual institutions. Housing finance in the 
Twenties and Thirties was, when viewed in reference to the standards of its time, neither successful nor 
unsuccessful. It made lending decisions on a case-by-case basis, without formally considering its macro 
impacts, and without altering its decisions to achieve broad social objectives. 
Housing finance can be called successful in the post-World War II era because it raised homeownership 
from 55.0% in 1950 to 66.2% in 2000 and 66.1% in 2010. It reversed a decline in homeownership that 
spanned the Depression, dropping the rate of home ownership from 45.6% in 1920 to 43.6% in 1940. 
The rate of home ownership reached 69% in 2007 but subsequently came down hard and fell as low as 
64.5% by 2014. That bruising decline was not the only traumatic housing debacle that the U.S. suffered 
in the post-World War II time frame. There were others in 1956-1957, 1966-1967, 1974-1975, 
1981-1982, and 1990-1991, before the calamitous unraveling of 2008-2009. 
The high level of home ownership came at the cost of violent swings in home-building, so that 
construction workers could not count on stable employment. Homeowners also had to cope with wide 
bipolar swings in homeowners’ equity. Investors and institutions that financed home construction and 
purchases also had to cope with volatile returns, defaults, and threats of financial contagion. In seeking 
ways of improving performance, it is useful to compute indicators of volatility for each of the two 
decades before World War II and for the three eras of post-World War II housing finance that we 
identify. If there is one era, or one channel that is characterized by greater stability, it will be 
worthwhile to consider why. But if all the time periods we studied are unstable in approximately the 
same degree, there would need to be further research to determine whether the instability is from 
exogenous sources.  
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3. Volatility Track Record 
3.1 Housing Finance in the United States 1920-1939 
Housing finance in the United States in the 1920s was erratic and less abundant than the period of high 
economic growth and investment would indicate. Finance flowed to industry and infrastructure, and to 
residential construction in smaller proportion. The growth companies of the 1920s were U.S. Steel, ATT, 
Radio Corporation of America, and General Electric. Projects to build roads, transmission lines, 
pipelines, and electric streetcars competed successfully for the available pool of funds. It was a 
pre-modern version of “crowding out”—the highly-rated borrowers in the industrial sector could 
borrow and soak up the funds that otherwise might have gone to residential construction. A 
countervailing force was urbanization. As workers moved to the cities, housing had to be built to 
accommodate the new arrivals. Suburbs also grew during the 1920s. In that was residential construction 
facilitated the growth of cities and accelerated the depopulation of the countryside by making it easier 
to move from the countryside to the city. 
The net effect of the dynamic shifts of population is that home ownership rose from 45.6% of 
households in 1920 to 47.8% in 1930. That might sound gradual, but it masks a volatile decade. 
Housing starts per 1000 people were as low as 10.0 in 1920, shot up to 34.0 in 1925, then sagged down 
to 17.2 in 1929. 
Home building in the 1930s was depressed during the entire decade. For example, housing starts per 
1000 people were below 10 for the years 1931-1936. Starts finally struggled up to 14.9 in 1939. If 
twice as many houses had been started each year, the performance would still have been less than the 
average for the 1920s. Clearly there was lost output—in part due to the lack of stable jobs that would 
allow a wage-earner to pay a mortgage, and in part due to the chronic underperformance of the 
financial services sector during that traumatized decade. Many houses were not built, and the jobs for 
construction workers were not created. From the vantage point of eight decades later, it is difficult to 
know how many houses might have been built if the financial system had been able to function more in 
keeping with the patterns that had been established in previous and subsequent decades. 
The overall view of housing starts in the Twenties and the Thirties is that both decades were unstable 
within each decade. Home building went through a boom in the middle years of the 1920s. Housing 
starts rose from 247,000 in 1920 to 937,000 in 1925, and then fell back to 509,000 in 1929. In the 
Thirties, despite the gloom hanging over the entire decade, there was a similar amount of volatility. 
Housing starts ranged from a meager 93,000 in 1933 to a less-than-robust 515,000 in 1939.  
3.2 Post-World War II Volatility 
How volatile has U.S. housing finance been since World War II? Has there really been a period when it 
was stable, and a later period when it was disrupted? Has investment in residential real estate been 
associated with booms and recessions in GDP growth? The graphs below track Housing Starts and 
Percentage Change in real GDP over the period 1945-2015. It is tantalizing to note that strong Housing 
Starts (1.3 million units or more) always preceded or accompanied strong (3% or higher) growth in real 
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GDP for the years of the post-World War II period. It is also clear that the steep drop in housing starts 
and the painfully slow rebound from the financial crisis of 2008 was accompanied by the anemic 
growth of GDP over the period since 2008. This rebound of homebuilding and home-buying was 
sluggish despite multiple attempts by government agencies to accelerate the rebound. 
 
 
Figure 1. Housing Starts: 1945-2015 
 
 
Figure 2. Percent Change in Real GDP: 1948-2015 (12 Month Lag) 
 
For a cursory look at how volatile the two eras were, we computed the standard deviations of housing 
starts for 1945-1971 and for 1972-2008. These results are 313,579 starts for 1945-1971, 349,538 for 
1972-2008, and 215,848 for 2009-2015. Superficially, those figures imply that the era of 
decentralization, consolidation and securitization was characterized by more volatility than the savings 
bank era. The difference, however, is small and subject to error because for 1945-1959 we used annual 
data, and for 1960-2015 we used quarterly data. Also the standard deviations should be compared to the 
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annual averages for the three eras, and when we do the comparison that way, the results are even less 
conclusive. The savings bank era and the deregulation, consolidation and securitization eras were about 
equally volatile. The most volatile era relative to its average was the post-crisis prudent era. That result, 
however, is due to the very depressed level of housing starts for the years 2009-2015. The data show 
high volatility because housing starts rose sharply as the sector recovered, so its standard deviation can 
be seen as a metric of the leaps upward that housing starts displayed. For the post-crisis years average 
annual housing starts were only 794,440, rising from barely over 500,000 to over 1,200,000. The 
average for the post-crisis period was only about half the average for the years 1945-1971 and 
1972-2008. 
These standard deviation calculations reveal that there has not been an era of housing finance in the 
United States that was decidedly more stable than any other. There are people who speak fondly of the 
savings bank era, perhaps because it was superior to the pre-World War II pattern of housing finance. 
But that is an unfair comparison. Prior to the Housing Act of 1937, the de facto policy of the United 
States was to leave housing finance to the private sector. Therefore, it is to be expected that housing 
finance in the 1920s and 1930s would have been a spotty hodgepodge of ups and downs that most 
certainly were ramped up during the 1920s and drastically curtailed in the 1930s. So the savings bank 
era was productive, in terms of housing units that were constructed, but for home buyers and investors 
and institutions financing home buyers, that era was as much a roller-coaster ride as any of the others.  
 
4. The Savings Bank Era, 1945-1971 
As a way of illustrating the long, complicated history of the U.S. financial system, and the ways the 
U.S. has provided mortgage financing, we trace the rise and fall of the savings banks (thrifts), and we 
discuss the reasons for their success and their eclipse. The rhetorical starting point of our discussion is 
that thrifts played a central role in the wave of home ownership that began in the 1940’s, continued in 
the 1950’s and 1960’s. The thrifts were a variable source of financing during the period 1945-1970, but 
they did not lose their dominant role until the 1970s, when they were vulnerable to maturity mismatch 
during the waves of inflation that characterized the years 1973-1980. The thrifts were providers of 
“community banking” style intermediation, in which middle-class couples bought homes by borrowing 
the savings of the communities where they lived. The lending officer for mortgage loans from thrift 
institutions was, in those bygone days, their neighbor or a person in their own community. 
The pattern of housing finance was in step with the policy of community-level banking that emerged 
following the 1929 stock market crash. The financial reforms of the New Deal explicitly mandated that 
financial intermediaries were to be local. These reforms took different routes in each state to achieve a 
large, viable population of small banks that operated in towns and secondary cities. In the Midwest, 
many states were “unit banking” states, meaning that a bank could have only one office. In the 
Northeast, the rules were slightly different but the result was the same. Massachusetts, for example, 
allowed banks to expand only within the county where their headquarters was located. Advocates of 
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this granular approach to banking point to its success in fostering home-building and home ownership. 
Before 1929, the banking sector was concentrated, and big banks in the cities could attract the savings 
of small communities. The dominant view in the early 1930s was that the large banks starved the small 
towns and rural areas of credit, so home buyers could not obtain financing. That view, combined with 
the country’s long history of distrust of financial intermediaries, provided motivation for local-to-local 
lending and borrowing. The citizenry’s distrust of centralized financial intermediation was a core tenet 
of Thomas Jefferson’s thinking and predated the War of Independence. One of the underlying 
objectives of the New Deal reforms was to break up the big banks, and foster local lending. To 
diminish the advantages large banks had, states and the Federal government imposed restrictions that 
favored small institutions. Three illustrations of these restrictions will characterize the ways that 
governments and regulators mandated the market should be compartmentalized along geographic lines, 
and blunted the advantages that consolidated financial firms could have. First, the states imposed 
restrictions on how many branches a bank could have. Some Midwestern states became “unit banking” 
states—meaning a bank could have only one office in that state, and could not create branch offices 
outside the state. Second, most lenders were prohibited from issuing a mortgage on a house more than 
50 miles from their office. And third, Regulation Q prevented banks from competing aggressively for 
funds. 
To continue with this rhetorical depiction of the thrift era, the U.S. financial system, as reconstituted 
after the Great Depression, worked very well to finance home ownership in 1946-1950, the immediate 
post-World War II years. The system not only performed its role, but also did so without destabilizing 
other parts of the financial system, and without triggering any international financial crises. Its 
performance in the 1950s and 1960 was much spottier. Then from 1971 onward, the intermediaries that 
finance home purchases suffered both neglect and regulatory defeats that gradually crippled their 
ability to supply financing for homebuyers. The year 1971 was also when the Bretton Woods systems 
of international payments came unraveled. Bretton Woods gave the U.S. dollar an exalted role, and that 
might have increased the willingness of lenders to provide long-term fixed-rate mortgages. These 
regulatory defeats, and losses on their portfolios of long-term, low-interest mortgage loans, almost put 
the traditional housing lenders out of business. This friendly, easy-to-understand source of financing for 
home purchases has not recovered. What replaced it was the securitization era, which was not a 
wellspring of sustainable economic growth, but instead a source of volatility, a driver of boom-and-bust 
cycles, vulnerable to crisis, and predisposed to fuel financial bubbles. 
Is that characterization of these two eras accurate? Was housing finance stable during the thrift era, and 
then unstable during the securitization era? To be generous, we share the widely held view that housing 
finance was unstable but largely successful, at least on its own terms, in the period 1945-1970. For the 
post-1971 period, the weight of expert opinion is more critical. The accusations are that housing 
finance was unstable and pro-cyclical from 1971 onward. For the post-crisis prudent era, the 
institutions were successful in imposing very strict underwriting standards, so loan losses on new 
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credits have been low; but the low volume of lending clearly fell short of what was needed to finance 
the higher levels of home buying that would have sparked a stronger economic recovery in the U.S.  
 
5. The Era of Deregulation, Consolidation and Securitization 
The pattern of mortgage origination changed in the first years of the 1970s. Commercial banks, savings 
banks and cooperative banks began to sell the mortgages they originated. There had been a few cases in 
previous decades of mortgage lenders who sold their loans, or originated loans that were going to be 
guaranteed by a government agency. But the big event was the creation of GNMA pass-through 
securities. Those appeared in 1970, and we have chosen 1971 as the last year of the savings bank era. 
The issuance of mortgage-backed securities took off, from less than 1% of residential mortgages 
outstanding, to over 6% by 1975. Savings banks held over 55% of outstanding single family mortgages 
in 1970, but by 1990 savings banks’ market share had declined to 22.9%, of outstanding single family 
mortgages, and continued to decline to 11.9% by 2000. The market share of mortgage-backed securities 
rose sharply, reaching 50.5% by 1995. 
Well before the formal starting date for securitization, deregulation was already creeping in. The formal 
restrictions imposed during the worst days of the Depression remained in effect for decades after the 
end of World War II. During the 1950s and the 1960s there was a tacit truce between the advocates of 
community banking and the advocates of centralization and economies of scale. With respect to the 
perennial tug-of-war between the financial regulators and the financial services firms, the Fifties and 
Sixties were quiet. Bankers and the larger community accepted the system they had inherited from the 
Depression years because it performed well enough in comparison with the system that they 
remembered from before the War.  
There were many innocuous but telling moments in the meandering path toward deregulation.  
As early as 1967, First Chicago Bank, operating in Illinois, tried to open a check-cashing office a short 
distance from its sole office. In Illinois banks were not allowed to have any branches. The rules rigidly 
prohibited them from having more than one office. This was to prevent them from taking advantage of 
economies of scale, and so prevent them from acquiring excessive economic power. The judge, 
interpreting the law correctly, denied their request. So they created entirely new banks and opened them 
at the locations where they had previously sought to open branches. In that way First Chicago achieved 
its aim, and made one of the earliest “back door” exceptions to the prevailing regulations against 
branching.  
That early exception was followed by many more. After 1970 it became possible to create a financial 
holding company that included several types of non-bank financial intermediaries. Each holding 
company also held a federally-chartered commercial bank These bank holding companies became 
known as “financial supermarkets” because they offered such a wide range of products and services. 
They enjoyed the benefit of membership in the Federal Reserve system, with access to the lender of last 
resort; and they also allowed the holding company to use higher leverage than would have been 
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permitted if all the lines of business had been consolidated on the federally-chartered bank’s books. 
Deregulation continued, sometimes for ad hoc reasons or for expediency. One way the barriers to 
interstate banking were relaxed was when regulators allowed a bank from outside a jurisdiction or 
regulatory district to buy a bank that was failing. The social objective of keeping banking local gave 
way little by little to pressures to consolidate and centralize. The Congress codified deregulatory 
guidelines in several landmark laws. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Control Act of 1980 
allowed more bank mergers than previous rules had allowed. Another landmark was the formal repeal 
in 1999 of the Glass Steagall law. Famously, prior to the 1929 stock market crash, the relationship 
between investment banking and commercial banking had been too cozy. The Congress evidently 
decided that the demarcation had already been blurred and was no longer a source of moral hazard. 
There were more changes that undermined the thrifts, and a few that helped them. Regulation Q is a 
good example. It capped the rates that banks could pay on savings deposits, and so it neutralized the 
advantage that big city depository institutions might have had. It also prohibited paying interest on 
checking account deposits. As an illustration of the push and pull of regulation, thrifts were allowed to 
pay interest on checking account deposits as early as 1974 in New England. By then, however the 
process of disintermediation (as Gurley and Shaw called it in their classic 1960 book) was nibbling 
away at the thrifts’ deposits. Money market mutual funds could circumvent the ceiling on deposit rates, 
so when inflation rose sharply, the non-bank financial intermediaries were able to take advantage and 
win market share. 
Consolidation and conglomeration also were allowed. For a revealing indicator of how many bank 
mergers were allowed, a simple graph of the number of banks and thrifts is given below. The total 
peaked at over 18,000 in the early Eighties, and has fallen to about a third as many since then. This 
decline was partly due to bank and thrift failures. Those happened in waves, most notably in the 
1980-82 time frame, when high interest rates hit the income statements of many thrifts. Their net 
interest margins went negative, and their equity bled away, and they could not continue as independent 
entities. 
Another way that thrifts disappeared was by converting cooperative ownership structures into common 
stock ownership. During the Great Depression, many mutual savings banks and cooperative savings 
banks came into existence. These belonged to their depositors, and from time to time would pay 
dividends to depositors in addition to the interest they paid to depositors. This heirloom form of 
organization worked well, but the ups and downs of the stock market occasionally created opportunities 
for converting these cooperative banks into common stock ownership. It was then possible, during 
times when shares of financial institutions traded above book value per share, to convert a cooperative 
bank and obtain a windfall gain by selling the shares to the public. That quirky attribute proved to be 
the downfall of the cooperative and mutual savings banks. After the conversion, these community 
banks continued to serve their local communities, but were often acquired by larger financial 
institutions headquartered in bigger cities. These formerly independent lenders then had less autonomy 
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and less latitude to operate according to their traditional rules of thumb. 
There was another convention that contributed to the demise of many thrifts. This is a rule that makes 
sense but can have an unintended effect. The thrifts were required to mark their portfolios of mortgage 
loans to market. Their practice had been “book value” accounting for mortgage loans that were in good 
standing. Thrifts carried the loans on their books showing the remaining principal balance due. As the 
homeowners paid off the mortgages, the thrifts would report that the value of each loan was equal to 
the remaining principal due. During a period of high interest rates, that accounting convention would 
overvalue the loans, because in the event that the thrift tried to sell the loans, it would obtain much less 
than the remaining principal amount. 
In the late Seventies and early Eighties, the need arose to sell mortgage loans that were in good 
standing. The thrift that originated the loan was failing, and needed to be liquidated or forcibly merged. 
The secondary market for mortgage loans treated them like corporate bonds, and valued them 
according to the present value of the remaining steam of payments. During those stressful days when 
short-term interest rates rose above 18%, dealers would not pay the conventional book value figure for 
the loans. The failing thrift was not only illiquid but insolvent. So the depositors had to be paid from 
deposit insurance. If too many thrifts had failed, the deposit insurance fund would have been exhausted, 
and the U.S. Treasury would have had to step in to pay off the depositors. The potential consequences 
were too grave, so the thrifts, along with the commercial banks and every other financial services firm, 
were required to mark their portfolios to market. That rule was a blow to the classic design of the thrifts, 
and it also encouraged them to sell the loans promptly after originating them, instead of holding the 
loans to maturity as they had customarily done for decades.  
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Figure 3. Number of FDIC Insured Banks, Commercial & Savings 1945-2015 
 
Seeing how the number of commercial banks and thrifts declined, an observer might think that the total 
deposits of banks and thrifts might have declined. But what really happened was that deposits rose 
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while the number of deposit-taking institutions shrank, and the average size of banks and thrifts grew.  
BANK DEPOSITS, COMMERCIAL & SAVINGS, 1945-2015
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Figure 4. Bank Deposits, Commercial & Savings, 1945-2015 
 
The result was they borrowers who went to their friendly local bank or thrift found that there was still 
an office there, or in the next town, but it was not the small institution that it had been years earlier. 
Instead it was a branch of a larger, less personal institution. 
The major change from the savings bank era, in terms of the effect that the change had on the “high 
touch” conventions of traditional mortgage lending, was securitization. Lenders stopped keeping the 
loans in their portfolios, first as a way to steer clear of the maturity mismatch that had doomed many 
old-style thrifts. Then they found that they could originate loans intending to sell them. If the loans met 
the mandated criteria, the thrift or the commercial bank could sell the loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, and those agencies would guarantee the payments. The secondary mortgage market mushroomed, 
partly because the mortgages were guaranteed, and partly because mortgage loans are good raw 
material for finance experts who use them to create bonds with attributes that appeal to investors. 
The securitization era had advantages versus the savings bank era, but it had fatal flaws that are now 
well known. We do not enumerate the flaws, because they are well known and more than adequately 
summarized elsewhere.  
 
6. The Post-Crisis-Prudence Era 
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, opportunistic buyers who had cash stepped in. The evidence is 
that home buyers did not use as much mortgage financing as they did during pre-crisis periods. Since 
2009 a large percentage of home purchases have been for cash. As the recovery has progressed, a lower 
portion of sales have been for cash. For example, in November 2014, 36.1% of home purchases were 
for cash. That is down from the peak of January 2011, when 46.4% of house purchases were for cash. 
The low rate of conventionally financed purchases indicates low participation by middle-class families 
and high participation by vulture investors and speculators. It also indicates that housing finance had 
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suffered setbacks that curtailed or interrupted the supply of credit to conventional buyers. 
Lenders who were able to operate during the post-crisis era were well advised to be ultra-prudent. They 
could not be certain what the capital adequacy requirements would be, nor what risk weightings might 
be assigned to loans in their portfolios. They were also wary of selling loans, knowing that the days of 
non-recourse sales have ended. Any loan that went into default was very likely to be sent back to the 
originating institution, with a formal request for full restitution. So lenders could not make as many 
loans as their equity capital previously could support.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The chaotic pattern that we have reviewed has been going on for almost a full century. The estimates of 
lost GDP presented in the second paper in this series show how pernicious the volatility has been. In 
view of the erratic performance, and the lost GDP, it is appropriate to propose and debate reforms to the 
ways the U.S. financial system finances this important sector of the economy.  
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